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DB pension plans have attracted 
significant attention recently
 Bankrupt companies: transferred under-funded plans to gov’t
insurer (United Airlines, US Air, Bethlehem Steel)
 Healthy (and not-so-healthy) companies
 closed DB plans to new workers (IBM, Alcoa, GM) 
 frozen DB plans for existing workers (IBM, Verizon, HP)
 opened DC plans
 U.S. Congress recently passed pension reform bill to increase 
financial strength of gov’t insurer (PBGC)
 Increased funding, different accounting rules, …
 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) and other regulatory
bodies continue to discuss modifying rules for financial reporting of 
DB pensions
 Discussion of moving from actuarial to market valuations3
There has been a major decline in the 


















































































Source: Department of Labor, form 5500 reports
Defined Benefit Only
Defined Contribution Only
Both Defined Benefit and  
Defined Contribution4
But DB plans remain important
 Assets in private DB plans ≈ assets in DC plans
 DC:  $ 2.2 trillion   DB:  $ 2.0 trillion  (2000)
www.dol.gov/ebsa/PDF/2000pensionplanbulletin.PDF
 Still many participants in plans
 Private sector workers (previous slide): ≈ 20 million 
 Retirees (excluded from previous slide): ≈ 24 million
 Government employees (excluded from previous slide)5
Big issues for DB pensions
1. How to measure liabilities?
2. What are appropriate funding levels?
3. What is appropriate asset allocation?  
 Firms, workers, and regulators likely to 
answer these questions differently6
Debate over how much in equities a firm 
should hold in pension plan
 Popular practice: 60%   
 Common finance academic advice: little or none
 Bodie (1990, 2006)
 Gold and Hudson (2003)
 Importance highlighted in 2000-2002
 interest rates fell (raising PV liabilities)
 stock market fell (lowering assets)
 led to large drop in funding ratio
 $38 billion under-funding in 2001, $139 billion under-
funding in 20027












































































Pension Asset Allocation: 
The Example of  Boots (UK retailer)
 Shifted to 100% bond financing (2001), on 
recommendation by finance chief John Ralfe
 Partial shift back (2004) (15% equities and 
property) after Ralfe left
 Generated lots of debate within the UK and 
elsewhere10
Our goal: re-examine key issues,  
incorporating long-run link between labor 
earnings and stock returns
 Measuring liabilities
 Appropriate valuation model / discount rate
 Asset allocation
 Does hedging demand justify holding stocks?11
Previous literature on implications of 
wage/stock link for DB pensions
 Black (1989)
 “Stocks go up when it looks like times will be good.  In good 
times, wages … tend to grow faster than usual. Thus the 
broader your view of the pension liability, the more stocks you 
will need for hedging.”
 Sundaresan and Zapatero (1997)
 Smith (1998)
 Cardinale (2004)12
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Typical DB Benefit Formula
biR = k * NiT * WiT
 biR: annual benefits throughout retirement
 k:   fixed percentage (e.g. 2%)
 T:   year preceding separation, retirement,
or plan freezing
 NiT: number of years worked through T
 WiT: earnings in year T14
Measures of pension liabilities 
(narrow → broad)
i) Σcurrent workers b(k, Nit , Wit)( A B O )
ii) Σcurrent workers b(k, Nit , WiT)( P B O )
iii) Σcurrent workers b(k, NiT , WiT)   (Broad PBO)
iv) Σcurrent+future workers b(k, NiT , WiT) (All-inclusive PBO)
t: current year
T: year prior to separation (random as of t)15
Measures of Pension Liabilities: 
Discussion
 ABO
 Legal obligation of the firm based on accrued liability
 Future payouts fixed in nominal terms
 Uncertainty about length of payouts (longevity)
 Very bond-like (+ longevity bond)
 PBO
 Takes into account that future payouts depend on realizations 
of future labor earnings
 Potential to be correlated with stocks
 Broad PBO
 Also includes anticipated tenure effects
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The Model – Overview
 We compute the current market value of the firm’s 
future pension outflows
 We consider the pension plan as a “stand-alone” obligation
 Main focus is on “broad PBO,” but same approach is applicable 
to many possible measures
 How our approach differs from existing literature:
 Computes market value (vs. actuarial value) 
 Uses an options pricing approach
 Incorporates new evidence on the long-run correlation between 
labor earnings growth and asset returns18
The model – empirical observations we 
want to capture
 Low annual correlation between aggregate wage growth and 
stock returns (e.g., Goetzman, 2005)  
 Labor earnings growth much smoother than stock returns
 Labor earnings and stock prices are positively related in the long 
run 
 Direct evidence: Cardinale (2004), Benzoni et al (2006)
 Indirect evidence: 
 Dividend growth and consumption growth become more correlated over 
longer horizons (e.g., Bansal and Yaron (2004), Hansen, Heaton and Li 
(2005), Julliard and Parker (2005))
 Labor earnings and consumption highly correlated over medium and long 
horizons 
 For a dissenting view, see Lustig and van Nieuwerburgh (2006)19
The Model – Stock Returns
 Stocks follow a log-normal diffusion
 Only stock market risk is priced
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The Model – Labor Earnings
 Human capital 
 Log-normal diffusion term (idiosyncratic risk) 
 Pulls at the rate γ to a target ratio of human capital to 
stock (T*)
 Labor earnings are like a dividend payment
 Labor earnings
 Pull towards target payout on human capital (sticky)
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Model Parameters: 
labor earnings and stock returns
mean stock return (rs)0 . 0 5
payout rate on human capital  (rw)0 . 0 2
dividend yield (div) 0.02
std dev stock return σs 0.18
std dev idio. human capital return (σw) 0.04
risk free rate (rf)0 . 0 2
mean growth human capital (α) 0.02
reversion of human capital to target (γ) 0.10
speed of reversion in labor earnings (β) 0.3322
Implied model correlations between 




Based on non-overlapping 1, 3, and 5 year intervals,
simulation results23




















Wage Growth Stock Return24
Model Parameters: 
separation, life expectancy, bankruptcy
Table 1:  Annual Separation Rates
separation rate x < age 35 0.060
separation rate  age 34 < x < age 
46
0.045
separation rate age 45 < x < age 56 0.040
separation rate age 55 < x 0.050
Based on Poterba, Venti, Wise (2005)
• The mortality rate: 0.3% per year for workers less than 65, and 5.0% 
per year for workers after 65 (SSA Trustees Report).  
•The probability of bankruptcy is 0.5 percent per year, independent of 
the value of the stock market. 25
Valuation: Methodology
 Key observation: Pension obligations can be valued as derivative
securities
 Monte Carlo simulation (risk neutral probabilities)
 Each year, random draws determine the innovations to stocks 
and earnings, as well as whether worker separates or dies
 Calculate the future value of benefits at separation or retirement 
 Future value discounted to present using risk neutral measure
 Present value is average across many simulations26
Hedging: Methodology
 Valuation method also implies hedging strategy
 Finding share of stock in hedge portfolio (δ )
 Run parallel Monte Carlo simulation run using same shocks, 
different initial stock value
 Estimate sensitivity of market value of liability to change in initial 
stock value (the δ ) 
 Investing a fraction δ in the stock market equates sensitivity 
of hedge portfolio and sensitivity of liability to a change in 
stock price
 Resulting stock investment share is time varying!27
Computing Discount Rates: Methodology
 Traditionally, liabilities discounted at fixed discount rate
 Model shows that no single rate is theoretically correct
 But model can be used to approximate a single rate
 Define discount rate (IRR) as: rate such that model 
value of liabilities = discounted value of average future 
benefits (under true probability measure)28
Caveats regarding the model
 Assumes that some risks are not priced
 labor earnings risk that is orthogonal to the stock market
 aggregate mortality risk
 Assumes away correlations between
 job separations and stock market
 firm-specific productivity shocks and firm-specific labor earnings
 Assumes aggregate shocks affect individuals 
proportionately at all ages; and flat age/earnings profile
 Ignores inflation risk
 Ignores interest rate term structure29
Outline
 Defining liabilities
 A model for valuing and hedging liabilities
 Model results
 Valuation and Hedging
 Example of Alcoa
 Estimating Discount Rates
 Example of Alcoa
 Caveats on asset allocation
 Empirical evidence
 Conclusions and policy implications30
Valuation and Hedging:
Qualitative Results
 Share of stocks in optimal hedge portfolio 
varies with 
 Status of participants (active vs. retired)
 Mostly active Æ large stock share
 Mostly separated or retired workers Æ small stock share
 Separation triggers portfolio rebalancing, with stocks sold 
and replaced by bonds. 
 Age of active employees
 Optimal hedge portfolio is dynamic, with the share of 
stocks decreasing in age.31
Valuation and Hedging: 
The Case of Alcoa
 Data for 6,178 workers on salary, age, tenure 
(for “Plan 1” active workers in 2000)
 Alcoa’s actual portfolio
 52% of pension assets in risky securities (domestic and 
foreign stock, and private equity)
 Model results 
 Share of stock in optimal hedge portfolio ranges from 86% for 
young workers to 8% for workers aged 62.
 Weighted average share of stock for active workers is 57%
 But, this ignores non-active participants (separated 
and retired)32
Table A1: Pension Benefits and Share of Stock 
in Hedge Portfolio (Alcoa Plan 1, Base Case 
Parameters)
# workers Current age Years worked Current salary ($) PV ($) Stock %
108 27 0 38,289 64,202 86
41 27 7 44,062 99,829 78
178 37 7 64,252 181,088 76
262 37 12 69,805 247,057 74
90 47 7 64,493 206,624 66
214 57 32 85,997 699,528 33
61 57 37 82,801 764,553 32
34 62 32 71,451 599,670 8
24 62 37 89,897 860,155 8
303 47 22 76,549 436,409 6333
Valuation and Hedging: 
The Case of Alcoa
 In 2003, Alcoa has 22,500 active participants, 34,500 
retirees, 14,000 separated workers and 9,600 
beneficiaries
 Model implies no stocks for non-active participants
 Taking into account the likely size of obligations to 
non-active participants (see text), the share of stock 
attributable to a hedging motive falls to 9.1 percent34
Valuation and Hedging: 
Conclusions
 For firms like Alcoa with more retirees and separated 
workers than active participants, a hedging demand 
cannot justify the typical allocation of over 50% of 
pension assets to stocks
 For firms with a higher percentage of active participants, 
a significant allocation to stocks is perhaps justifiable
 Quantities are sensitive to parameters (e.g., speed of 
reversion to target human capital ratio), but these 
conclusions appear to be robust for a reasonable range of 
parameters35
Discount Rates – The Case of Alcoa
 Implied discount rate found for each group of Plan 1 
workers 
 Implied share of stock in discount rate decreases with 
age
 Weighted average for active workers implies stock 
share of 30.8% in rate 
 Taking into account retired and separated workers as 
above, share of stock in discount rate falls to 4.9%36
Table A2: Stock Share in Discount Rate and Hedge 




Share stock in 
discount rate
Share stock in 
hedge port. 
108 27 0 0.53 0.86
41 27 7 0.47 0.78
…
178 37 7 0.44 0.76
262 37 12 0.43 0.74
…
90 47 7 0.36 0.66
303 47 22 0.33 0.63
…
…
34 62 32 0.04 0.08
24 62 37 0.04 0.08
214 57 32 0.15 0.33
61 57 37 0.15 0.3237
Discount Rates – The Case of Alcoa
 Notice compression of discount rate share of stocks 
relative to hedge share of stocks for active workers
 Explained by discount rates averaging periods of high and low 
stock holdings in hedge portfolio, due to separations
 Alcoa reports
 Expected return on long-term assets of 9%
 Discount rate of 7.75% used to discount pension liabilities
 What does the model suggest?
 Assume Treasury rate of 5.5%, expected stock return of 10%
 4.9% stock weight => discount liabilities at 5.7%
 Suggests liabilities are significantly understated in financial 
statements38
Discount Rates: Conclusions
 Appropriate discount rate for liabilities = average rate of return 
on optimal hedge portfolio
 In practice, regulations require firms to use different discount
rates for different calculations:
 For earnings reporting, generally a few percentage points above 
Treasury rate, based on expected asset returns
 For IRS/ERISA high quality bond yield
 Further distortions from smoothing
 For companies like Alcoa with many retirees, discounting at high
rates significantly understates pension liabilities in financial
statements
 For firms with predominantly active workers, estimated pension 
liabilities may be close to, or even overstate, their true value39
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From hedge portfolio to asset allocation
 Derived hedge portfolio for stand-alone liabilities
 Implications for pension fund asset allocation?
 Should firm’s hedge?
 Which liability measure should/do they hedge?
 Economic or accounting measures???
 One approach: write down explicit objective function 
and solve for optimal pension funding and asset 
allocation decisions (we’ll pursue in future draft)
 For now, we use share of stocks in hedge portfolio as  
suggestive proxy for share from optimization problem41
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Empirical Evidence: Data Description
 Data on investment practices of 1,000 largest pension 
plans obtained from “Pensions and Investments,” 2004 
listing
 Matched with Compustat info on sponsor assets and 
liabilities, pension plan assets and liabilities, and info from 
Form 5500 on number of active, retired, separated and 
dependent participants
 Merton-type model used to estimate firm asset volatility 
and expected return on firm assets
 Matched sample has 168 firms, with pension benefit 
obligations totaling $900 billion (narrow PBO measure)43
Figure 2






























Source: Pensions and Investments, 2004, authors’ 
calculations44
Empirical Evidence
 Model suggests hypothesis:
 Firms with a higher portion of active participants will invest a
higher portion of pension assets in risky securities
 Several alternatives considered:
 Moral hazard from PBGC insurance causes riskier and more 
under-funded firms to invest more in riskier asset classes (under-
funding, asset volatility, leverage)
 Higher expected return on firm assets makes managers reluctant 
to accept lower returns on pension assets, even if fair on risk-
adjusted basis45
Empirical Evidence
Risky Asset Share on Share Not Active
COEF. T-STAT ADJ. R2
share not active -.119 -2.6 .032
 Small but significant negative relationship between equity 
share in pension assets and share of non-active participants 
 Other regressions show relation between moral hazard 
indicators and stock share (consistent with Rauh)
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Conclusions and Policy Implications
 Wage/stock link provides a potential rationale for 
holding stocks as DB pension assets
 Firms with primarily retired or separated participants 
should hold bonds (they generally do not)
 Firms with primarily young active participants should 
invest in equity 
 Overall, firms appear over-invested in equity relative 
to optimal hedge – still a question why is this?48
Conclusions and Policy Implications
 Implications for financial reporting
 Model could be used to construct rules-of-thumb for appropriate 
discount rates based on firm and participant characteristics.
 Current FASB rule of crediting earnings with the average return 
on pension assets, while smoothing volatility of asset returns, 
provides an incentive to over-invest in risky securities.
 Basing liability measurement on market values could encourage 
firms to hedge.
 Implications for gov’t pension insurer (PBGC)
 PBGC is like a very old firm (no active workers), and therefore a 
conservative investment policy is appropriate.
 This may not, however, be a good model for young firms.49
Conclusions and Policy Implications
 Would limits on risky pension investments be costly to 
sponsors, and hence plan participants?
 Some academics have proposed severely limiting pension asset 
allocations to equities.
 To the extent there is a hedging demand, such restrictions are 
likely to be most costly for young firms, who already are 
disinclined to provide DB plans.
 Although risk needs to be controlled, overly restrictive 
regulation that discourages DB pension provision could also 
reduce welfare.50
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